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We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that
agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses or best-
responses. First, we show that a necessary condition for recurrent implementation in
better-response dynamics (BRD) is a small variation of Maskin monotonicity, which
we call quasimonotonicity. We also provide a mechanism for implementation in BRD
if the rule is quasimonotonic and excludes worst alternatives – no worst alternative
(NWA). Quasimonotonicity and NWA are both necessary and suﬃcient for absorbing
implementation in BRD. Moreover, they characterize implementation in strict Nash
equilibria. Under incomplete information, incentive compatibility is necessary for any kind
of stable implementation in our sense, while Bayesian quasimonotonicity is necessary for
recurrent implementation in interim BRD. Both conditions are also essentially suﬃcient
for recurrent implementation, together with a Bayesian NWA. A characterization of
implementation in strict Bayesian equilibria is also provided. Partial implementation results
are also obtained.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The correct design of institutions can be decisive for achieving economic systems with good welfare properties. But
suppose that the correct design depends on the knowledge of key parameters in the environment. Then, an important
problem ensues if the builder of the institutions does not have such knowledge. The theory of implementation looks in a
systematic way at the design of rules for social interaction that do not assume a detailed knowledge of the fundamentals
by those with power to adjudicate social outcomes.
The last decades have seen impressive advances in the theory of implementation.1 As Sjöström (1994) pointed out,
‘With enough ingenuity the planner can implement “anything”’. On the other hand, several recent contributions2 have
highlighted the fact that not all mechanisms perform equally well, in terms of achieving the socially desirable outcomes.
In particular, some of the mechanisms that are more permissive, leading to a wider span of implementable social choice
correspondences (SCCs) or social choice functions (SCFs), may lead to dynamic instability or convergence to the wrong
* Corresponding author at: Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, Spain.
E-mail addresses: antonio.cabrales@uc3m.es (A. Cabrales), roberto_serrano@brown.edu (R. Serrano).
URLs: http://www.eco.uc3m.es/acabrales (A. Cabrales), http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano (R. Serrano).
1 See Jackson (2001), Maskin and Sjöström (2002), Palfrey (2002), Serrano (2004) or Corchón (2009) for recent surveys.
2 See e.g. Cabrales (1999) and the literature review at the end of this introduction.
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equilibrium when the players are boundedly rational. This should perhaps not be surprising since those mechanisms were
not designed with robustness to bounded rationality in mind, and yet, somewhat surprisingly, the canonical mechanism for
Nash implementation turned out to be robust to some kinds of bounded rationality (Cabrales, 1999).
Given these ﬁndings, it is natural to ask whether the diﬃculty with permissive mechanisms lies in the particular mech-
anisms employed, or if it is a general problem. In other words, what are the necessary conditions on SCCs for their
evolutionary implementation? Are they close to being suﬃcient as well? That is, can one characterize the set of rules
that a planner could hope to decentralize in a society populated by boundedly rational agents? The current paper answers
these questions when one models bounded rationality by myopic behavior that tends to move in the direction of better
replies (or best replies) to a bounded sample of past history, which conforms with a wide class of evolutionary settings.3
Thus, we postulate a behavioral assumption by which agents (or generations thereof) interact myopically within a given
institution, and adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses within the mechanism. We remark that the wide
class of dynamics considered here does not require that all better-responses be played with positive probability, although all
best-responses must be. Indeed, as we explain in the second remark after Theorem 2, our central results (in Section 3) and
their proofs go through unchanged if we switch from better-response dynamics to (full support) best-response dynamics.4
Our criterion for successful implementation will be the convergence of the better-response process to a rest point or to a set
of rest points. When all the outcomes of an SCC are the only limits of the better-response dynamics (BRD) of a mechanism
for any allowed environment, we shall say that the SCC is implementable in recurrent strategies of BRD. If the only limits of
BRD lie in the SCC, we speak of partial implementability in recurrent strategies.
We come to describe our ﬁrst main ﬁnding. A necessary condition for recurrent implementation is a small variation
of (Maskin) monotonicity (Maskin, 1999), which we call quasimonotonicity. Quasimonotonicity prescribes that the social
outcome remain in the SCC if the strictly lower contour sets of preferences at that social outcome are nested for every
agent across two environments. In particular, it is neither logically stronger nor weaker than monotonicity, although both
coincide in many settings (we discuss the relationship in Section 2). Furthermore, quasimonotonicity is also suﬃcient for
recurrent implementation in BRD, if there are at least three agents in the environment and the SCC satisﬁes the “no worst
alternative” (NWA) property. This property requires that, for every environment, there is always a strictly worse outcome
for every agent than each outcome prescribed by the SCC. NWA becomes also necessary if the recurrent classes of the
better-response dynamics are singletons (i.e., absorbing states) in the implementing mechanism.
The typical mechanism that we construct has good dynamic properties. It implements the socially desirable outcome
according to the agents’ reports, if there is total agreement among them. If only one agent’s report disagrees with the rest,
other outcomes will be implemented. Those outcomes are meant to elicit the “right” behavior from agents. Finally, if more
than one agent disagrees, a “modulo” game is played. We note that the “modulo” game is not an essential part of the
mechanism. It can be replaced, for example, with a unanimously bad outcome for all players. What really matters (and the
“modulo” game delivers) is that outside from a situation of total (or almost total) agreement, it does not hurt to tell the
“truth”. This then implies that behavior can easily “drift” into unanimous truth-telling.5 Once agents agree, the rules for
almost unanimous agreement, which make use of both quasimonotonicity and the punishments that are possible by NWA,
avoid any “drifting out” of generalized agreement.
Our agents are boundedly rational – myopic better responders – yet they are able to act in an apparently complex
mechanism with a modulo game. While one could see our mechanism as complex, it is ﬁnite. The argument in the pre-
vious paragraph already hints at the fact that the nature of better responses in the “complex” mechanism is not unduly
complicated. It requires to understand what is your most preferred outcome, what is the true proﬁle and not much more.
More importantly, we believe that the question whether real agents are able to understand the game should be mostly
empirical. In this respect, the results of Cabrales et al. (2003) are encouraging. In a laboratory experiment, the likelihood of
the socially desired outcome being implemented was 0.80 in a treatment using a mechanism similar to the one we use for
our suﬃciency condition. Nevertheless, as already acknowledged in footnote 3, more research in this important question is
needed.
Our results on recurrent implementation in BRD are obtained for a general class of preferences and will stand for any
mutation process. The latter means that, if one were to perturb the BRD via mutations, an SCF that is implementable in
recurrent strategies would also be implementable in stochastically stable strategies of any perturbation of BRD; the reader is
referred to our companion paper for further details on this topic (Cabrales and Serrano, 2010). It follows that quasimono-
tonicity is identiﬁed as the key condition to essentially characterize very robust implementation with respect to myopic BRD
processes.6
3 In doing so, we acknowledge that some of the canonical mechanisms we construct might be “too complex” for boundedly rational agents, which forces
us to stress the word “towards” from our title even more strongly. References for evolutionary game theory in general are Weibull (1995), Vega-Redondo
(1996), Samuelson (1997), Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and Young (1998).
4 Fictitious play would require some more discussion, but an assumption of limited memory would lead to the same results.
5 Indeed, if agents were to have some arbitrarily small cost of misrepresenting their private information, as in Kartik (2009), this drift into unanimous
truth-telling could be quite fast.
6 It is important to stress how Maskin monotonicity has emerged in other works when robustness is required in other senses: Chung and Ely (2003)
if undominated Nash implementation is to occur with near-complete information, Aghion et al. (2010) for subgame-perfect implementation also with
near-complete information, and Bergemann et al. (2010) for rationalizable implementation.Author's personal copy
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Given that one can model bounded rationality in many different ways, we also explore (in Section 3.3) the robustness
to other such approaches of the conditions identiﬁed for recurrent implementation under BRD. A common feature of many
alternative approaches is the stability of strict Nash equilibria. Therefore we pose the question of implementation in strict
Nash equilibria and provide its characterization. We ﬁnd that we can dispense altogether with the standard no-veto-power
suﬃcient condition. In general environments with at least three agents both quasimonotonicity and NWA are necessary
and suﬃcient for implementation in strict equilibria. This provides a further strong endorsement of quasimonotonicity,
and raises the stature of the NWA condition. Indeed, NWA also becomes necessary when we require implementation in
absorbing strategies of BRD (see Section 3.3 for details).7 We view the strict Nash implementation result as a conﬁrmation
of the more general message sent by our ﬁndings for evolutionary implementation.8
Next, we also provide an almost characterization of partial implementability in recurrent strategies of BRD. The key
condition here is a version of quasimonotonicity applied to the entire SCC. When the range of the correspondence is rich,
this condition is typically trivial and thus, we learn that convergence of BRD processes to a set is much easier to obtain.
Our main insights already described are conﬁrmed in environments with incomplete information, and some others are
obtained therein (for simplicity, we present most of those results for SCFs and economic environments). First, incentive
compatibility arises as a necessary condition for stable implementation in our sense, whatever the perturbation one wishes
to use, including no perturbation at all, of interim BRD.9 If one wishes to implement in recurrent strategies, the condition of
Bayesian quasimonotonicity is also necessary. The comparison between this condition and Bayesian monotonicity, necessary
for Bayesian implementation (e.g., Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 1986; Palfrey and Srivastava, 1989; Jackson, 1991), is similar
to that between quasimonotonicity and Maskin’s condition.
Moreover, incentive compatibility, Bayesian quasimonotonicity and ε-security are also suﬃcient for implementation in
recurrent strategies of BRD processes when there are at least three agents.10
Finally, we provide a characterization of the SCFs that are implementable in strict Bayesian equilibria in general environ-
ments, a contribution in its own right, and also a vehicle to show the general implications of our basic results for recurrent
implementation of interim BRD. That is, parallel to Section 3.3, we also study in Section 5.2 the robustness of the conditions
identiﬁed for recurrent Bayesian implementation. Dropping the assumption of economic environments, we provide a full
characterization of strict Bayesian implementation with at least three agents. We remark that no such characterization is
available for Bayesian implementation.11 The conditions for strict Bayesian implementation are strict incentive compatibility,
Bayesian quasimonotonicity, and a version of the NWA condition for Bayesian environments.
1.1. Related literature
The study of implementation under bounded rationality has a long intellectual history. Muench and Walker (1984) and de
Trenqualye (1988) study the stability of the Groves and Ledyard (1977) mechanism.12 Walker (1984) describes a mechanism
for which almost Walrasian allocations in large economies are stable. Vega-Redondo (1989) proposes a globally convergent
mechanism (under best-response dynamics) to the Lindahl equilibrium in an economy with one private good, one public
good and linear production. Along the same lines, de Trenqualye (1989) proposes a locally stable mechanism to implement
Lindahl equilibria in an economy with multiple private goods, one public good, linear production and quasi-linear prefer-
ences. With respect to these early contributions, our paper does not focus on the stability of particular mechanisms, SCFs
or environments, and we deal with global, rather than local convergence.
More recently, Cabrales (1999) studies suﬃcient conditions for global convergence of (a variation of) the canonical mech-
anism for Nash implementation.13 The suﬃcient conditions used there are very similar to ours. However, Cabrales (1999)
does not study necessary conditions for convergence, but rather the bad dynamic properties of other (already existing)
mechanisms. And unlike Cabrales and Serrano (2010), that paper does not provide either additional conditions on dynamics
or preferences to deliver ergodic dynamic properties.14
Sandholm (2005) provides a suﬃcient concavity condition under which simple price schemes would be globally stable
when implementing eﬃcient SCFs in economic environments.15 Mathevet (2007) studies suﬃcient conditions for implemen-
7 Cabrales et al. (2003) show experimentally that in the absence of NWA, the performance of Maskin’s canonical mechanism for Nash implementation is
substantially worse.
8 The characterization of strict Nash implementation has interest in its own right. In particular, it is noteworthy how one can dispense with the “no-veto”
condition in non-random settings, even outside of economic environments.
9 Our comment above regarding better-responses versus best-responses applies here as well.
10 Under a weak diversity of preferences in the environment, the condition of Bayesian quasimonotonicity can be entirely dropped. This can be done if
the planner is satisﬁed with implementation in stochastically stable strategies under uniform mutations and at least ﬁve agents; see again Cabrales and
Serrano (2010).
11 Theorem 2 in Jackson (1991) for general environments is a suﬃciency result.
12 Chen and Plott (1996) and Chen and Tang (1998) conﬁrm experimentally these ﬁndings.
13 Cabrales et al. (2003) conﬁrm experimentally these ﬁndings.
14 Cabrales and Ponti (2000) study the convergence and stability properties of Sjöström’s (1994) mechanism assuming that the dynamics are monotonic
in the sense of Samuelson and Zhang (1992). Cabrales (1999) also discusses some drawbacks, from a dynamic point of view, of the mechanisms in Abreu
and Matsushima (1992, 1994).
15 Sandholm (2002) provides a concrete mechanism achieving eﬃciency and stability in a road congestion pricing problem.Author's personal copy
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tation in supermodular games, motivated by their good learning properties. In contrast, we do not take advantage of the
good convergence properties of dynamic processes when posing our general questions and constructing our mechanisms,
and therefore, the SCFs implemented in those papers must still meet our necessary conditions if the processes follow the
BRD direction.
Another important line of research has studied implementation that is statically robust to bounded rationality. Eliaz
(2002) shows that (a strengthening of) monotonicity and no-veto power are suﬃcient to implement an SCF even when
agents are error-prone, provided a “majority” of players are not. Tumennasan (2008) shows that (once again) quasimono-
tonicity is necessary for implementation when “all” agents are error-prone in the style of Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium
(LQRE), as deﬁned in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).16 Since the conditions used in the latter paper are closer to ours, we
discuss it in more detail later on.
The papers we have discussed so far typically focus on environments with complete information, that is, the agents’
know each others preferences. Notable exceptions are the previously mentioned paper of Mathevet (2007) and the impos-
sibility result of Jordan (1986). We extend the literature by also studying incomplete information environments. In this
respect, there is also a small related literature on the stability of equilibria for different auction and double auction formats
(including Hon-Snir et al., 1998; Dawid, 1999; Saran and Serrano, 2010).
1.2. Plan of the paper
Section 2 describes the model and the dynamics we use. Section 3 provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
recurrent implementation under complete information. Section 4 presents more permissive results – i.e., concerning non-
quasimonotonic rules – if one relies on partial implementability of SCCs. Section 5 collects the extensions of our results to
incomplete information environments. Section 6 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
Let N ={ 1,...,n} be a set of agents and let Z be a ﬁnite set of alternatives. Let θi denote agent i’s preference ordering
over the set Z.L e tθ = (θi)i∈N be a preference proﬁle, and Θ be the (ﬁnite) set of allowable preference proﬁles.17 We
assume that |Θ|  3, without loss of generality.18 The symbol  θ
i stands for i’s weak preference when the preference
proﬁle is θ, while  θ
i denotes i’s strict preference at θ and ∼θ
i denotes indifference. We refer to the set of agents, the set
of alternatives and agents’ preferences over alternatives as an environment. To the extent that the sets N and Z will remain
ﬁxed throughout, two environments differ only in that the preferences of some agents change across them. (In Section 5 we
shall consider also incomplete information environments, in which agents’ information may also change.)
A social choice correspondence (SCC) speciﬁes a set of alternatives for each preference proﬁle θ. Thus, an SCC F : Θ  → 2Z.
A social choice function (SCF) is an SCC that always assigns a singleton to each θ ∈ Θ. We shall denote an SCF by f , and thus,
f : Θ  → Z.
A mechanism G = ((Mi)i∈N, g), where Mi is agent i’s message set, and g :

i∈N Mi  → Z is the outcome function. A Nash
equilibrium of the mechanism in state θ is a proﬁle of messages m∗ such that for every i ∈ N, g(m∗)  θ
i g(mi,m∗
−i) for
all mi  = m∗
i . A strict Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which all these inequalities are strict. Given a proﬁle m ∈ 
i∈N Mi,a g e n tj’s (weak) better-response to m is any m 
j such that g(m 
j,m−j)  θ
j g(m).
For our ﬁrst set of results, in the next section, we begin by considering a speciﬁc class of SCCs. Most importantly, we
shall use the following condition, which turns out to be central to the theory we develop here:
An SCC F satisﬁes quasimonotonicity whenever, for every a ∈ F(θ), if it is true that for every i ∈ N and for all z ∈ A with
a  θ
i z we have that a  
φ
i z, this implies that a ∈ F(φ) for all θ,φ∈ Θ.
Note how quasimonotonicity resembles closely the condition of monotonicity uncovered in Maskin (1999). Indeed, the
only difference is that, while Maskin’s condition imposes that the lower contour sets of preferences be nested across two
environments, quasimonotonicity relies on the inclusion of the strictly lower contour sets. It follows from the deﬁnitions of
both conditions that quasimonotonicity is neither stronger nor weaker than Maskin monotonicity.19 The next two examples
present two important correspondences that make this point:
Example 1. Consider environments in which for no pair of alternatives z,z  ∈ Z it is the case that z ∼θ
i z  for all i ∈ N.D e ﬁ n e
the strong Pareto correspondence FSP : Θ  → 2Z as follows:
F
SP(θ) ≡

z ∈ Z:  z  ∈ Z, ∀i ∈ N, z   θ
i z and ∃j ∈ N, z   θ
j z

.
16 The notion of LQRE is itself closely associated with the stochastic choice models of Luce (1959) and McFadden (1973).
17 The ﬁniteness of Θ guarantees that we can study the dynamics for our mechanisms with ﬁnite Markov chain tools.
18 If |Θ|=2, one can always add an extra environment artiﬁcially by replicating one of the two preference proﬁles and use a third name for the new one.
19 This contrasts with other conditions previously found in the literature (e.g., the weaker “almost monotonicity” in Sanver, 2006), used to expand the
scope of Nash implementabillity by means of awards.Author's personal copy
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As is well known, FSP does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity: for instance, let N ={ 1,2} and Z ={ z,z }, θ be such that
z  θ
1 z  and z   θ
2 z, so that FSP(θ) ={z,z }.A n dl e tφ differ from θ only in that z ∼
φ
1 z , implying that z / ∈ FSP(φ).
However, it is easy to see that FSP will satisfy quasimonotonicity in any such environment. Indeed, suppose the hypoth-
esis of quasimonotonicity is satisﬁed (the inclusion of the strictly lower contour sets between θ and φ), and that z ∈ FSP(θ),
but z / ∈ F SP(φ). The latter implies that there exists z  such that z   
φ
i z for all i ∈ N and z   
φ
j z for some j ∈ N. Recalling
that it is not the case that z ∼θ
i z  for all i ∈ N, the inclusion of the strictly lower contour sets would imply that z   θ
i z for
all i ∈ N and that there exists some j ∈ N for whom z   θ
j z, contradicting that z ∈ FSP(θ).20
Example 2. Consider any environment. Deﬁne the weak Pareto correspondence FWP : Θ  → 2Z as follows:
F
WP(θ) ≡

z ∈ Z:  z  ∈ Z, ∀i ∈ N, z   θ
i z

.
As is well known, FWP always satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity. However, it may violate quasimonotonicity: for instance, let
N ={ 1,2} and Z ={ z,z }, θ be such that z ∼θ
1 z  and z   θ
2 z, so that FWP(θ) ={ z,z }.A n dl e tφ differ from θ only in that
z   
φ
1 z, implying that z / ∈ FWP(φ).
The above examples underscore the differences between Maskin monotonicity and quasimonotonicity. Nonetheless, there
are many environments in which the two conditions coincide. For example, consider a problem of assignment of indivisible
goods in which all preferences are strict (as in Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Roth and Postlewaite, 1977), or environments in
which agents’ preferences are continuous (in this case, the inclusion of lower contour sets and strictly lower contour sets is
equivalent).
In addition to quasimonotonicity, we shall use the following condition:
An SCC F satisﬁes no-worst-alternative (NWA) whenever for every agent i, every preference proﬁle θ and every a ∈ F(θ),
there exists an outcome z
a,θ
i such that a  θ
i z
a,θ
i .
In particular, NWA allows the possibility of punishing an agent at every outcome of the SCC.
In Section 5, in which we concentrate on economic environments and where the social choice rule allocates a bundle
to each agent, we shall use a version of NWA for SCFs. An SCF f is said to be ε-secure if there exists ε > 0 such that for
each θ, and for each i ∈ N, fi(θ)  (ε,...,ε)   0.
The condition of ε-security amounts to establishing a minimum threshold of living standards in the consumption of all
commodities. We shall think of ε as being a fairly small number. Then, one could easily justify it on normative grounds.
Next, we turn to dynamics, the central approach in our paper. The mechanism will be played simultaneously each period
by myopic agents. Or, in an interpretation closer to the evolutionary tradition, the mechanism will be played successively
each period by generations of agents who live and care for that period only. Given a mechanism, we take the set

i∈N Mi
of message proﬁles as the state space (which, to avoid further measure theoretic technicalities, we assume to be countable).
We shall begin by specifying a Markov process on this state space, i.e., a matrix listing down the transition probabilities
from any state to any other in a single period.21 Such a process will typically have multiple long-run predictions, which we
call recurrent classes. A recurrent class is a set of states that, if ever reached, will never be abandoned by the process, and
that does not contain any other set with the same property. A singleton recurrent class is called an absorbing state.
The Markov process that we shall impose on the play of the mechanism over time is the following better-response
dynamics (BRD). In each period t, each of the agents is given the chance, with positive, independent and ﬁxed probability, to
revise his message or strategy. Simultaneous revision opportunities for different agents are allowed. Let m(t) be the strategy
proﬁle used in period t, and say agent i is chosen in period t. Then, denoting by θi agent i’s true preferences, agent i
switches with positive probability to any m 
i such that g(m 
i,m−i(t))  
θi
i g(m(t)).22
Thus, the planner, who has a long run perspective on the social choice problem, wishes to design an institution or
mechanism such that, when played by myopic agents who keep adjusting their actions in the direction of better-responses,
will eventually converge to the socially desirable outcomes as speciﬁed by the SCC. This logic suggests the following notion
of implementability.
An SCC F is implementable in recurrent strategies (of BRD) if there exists a mechanism G such that, for every θ ∈ Θ and
every a ∈ F(θ), there is a recurrent class of the BRD process (applied to the induced game under preferences θ) such that
the class has a unique outcome and the outcome is equal to a. Furthermore, the outcome of any recurrent class of that BRD
process must be some a ∈ F(θ).
The dependence of long-run predictions of unperturbed Markov processes on initial conditions is sometimes perceived
as a drawback of this analysis. One way out is to perturb the Markov process, and this would lead to the concept of
implementability in stochastically stable strategies (the interested reader should see Cabrales and Serrano, 2010).
20 In environments similar to these where individual property rights are deﬁned, other examples of correspondences that violate Maskin monotonicity,
but that satisfy quasimonotonicity, include the strict individual rationality correspondence and its intersection with the strong Pareto correspondence.
21 For complete formal deﬁnitions of Markov chains, and related terms (recurrent classes, absorbing states, etc., see e.g. Karlin and Taylor, 1975, Chapter 2).
22 As we discuss in the second remark after Theorem 2, all the results can be extended to the case in which agents switch to play a subset of better-
responses (in particular, best-responses) to the mixed-strategy of the others given by the empirical distribution of play over some bounded sample ofp a s t
history.Author's personal copy
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3. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for recurrent implementation: Complete information
In this section we identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for implementability in recurrent strategies of BRD. The
section also discusses more general implications of these results, and in particular, the connections with implementation in
strict Nash equilibria.
3.1. Necessity
We seek implementation in recurrent strategies of the BRD. We wish to show now that quasimonotonicity of F is
a necessary condition for its implementability in recurrent strategies.
Theorem 1. If F is implementable in recurrent strategies of a BRD process, F is quasimonotonic.
Proof. Let the true preference proﬁle be θ.B e c a u s eF is implementable in recurrent strategies of BRD, the only outcomes
that correspond to strategy proﬁles in recurrent classes of the dynamics are a ∈ F(θ).
Let a ∈ F(θ), and now consider a preference proﬁle φ such that for all ia θ
i z implies that a  
φ
i z.S i n c ea is the only
outcome compatible with a recurrent class of the dynamics when preferences are θ, this means that agent i’s unilateral
deviations from recurrent strategy proﬁles in that class must yield either a again, or outcomes z such that a  θ
i z.B u t
then, the same recurrent class is also a recurrent class under φ, i.e., a is also supported by recurrent proﬁles of BRD when
preferences are φ.S i n c eF is implementable in recurrent strategies of BRD, this implies that a ∈ F(φ). That is, F must be
quasimonotonic. 
3.2. Suﬃciency
We now present our next result. Together with Theorem 1, it provides almost a characterization of the SCCs that are
implementable in recurrent strategies of BRD.
Theorem 2. Let n  3. If an SCC F satisﬁes quasimonotonicity and NWA, it is implementable in recurrent strategies of BRD.
Proof. Consider the mechanism G = ((Mi)i∈N, g), where agent i’s message set is Mi = Θ × Z × Z × N.D e n o t ea g e n ti’s
message mi = (θi,ai,zi,ni), and the agents’ message proﬁle by m. Let the outcome function g be deﬁned by the following
rules:
(i) If for all i ∈ N, mi = (θ,a,zi,ni) and a ∈ F(θ), g(m) = a.
(ii) If for all j  = i, mj = (θ,a,zj,nj) with a ∈ F(θ), and mi = (φ,a ,z,ni), (φ,a )  = (θ,a), one can have two cases:
(ii.a) If z  θ
i a, g(m) = z
a,θ
i – recall the deﬁnition of the NWA property.
(ii.b) If a  θ
i z, g(m) = z.
(iii) In all other cases, g(m) = zt, where t = (

i∈N ni)( mod n + 1).
Note how, because F satisﬁes NWA, rule (ii.a) is well deﬁned. Now, we begin by arguing in the next two steps that all
recurrent classes of the BRD process yield outcomes under rule (i). Let θ be the true preference proﬁle.
Step 1: No message proﬁle in rule (iii) is part of a recurrent class. Arguing by contradiction, from any proﬁle m in (iii), one
can construct a path as follows. There are two possible cases to consider.
Case A. If fewer than n − 2 agents make a common announcement of the preference proﬁle and of the alternative in the
SCC, no single agent can change his strategy and move the game to a proﬁle outside of rule (iii). Then, it is a best-response
for any agent i to choose a strategy (θ,a,ai,ni) with a ∈ F(θ), ni suitably chosen to win the modulo game and ai one of the
best possible outcomes for i under θ. If all agents get a simultaneous revision opportunity, the game goes to rule (i) and
yields a ∈ F(θ), from which one can never exit under BRD.
Case B. If, on the other hand, exactly n − 2 agents make a common announcement of the preference proﬁle and of the
alternative in the SCC, say (φ,a) with a ∈ F(φ), there is an agent who can change his strategy and move the game to a
proﬁle in (ii). Then, let any agent announcing (φ,a) get a revision opportunity and change to announcing (φ ,a ,ai,ni) with
a  ∈ F(φ ) and φ  different from any preference proﬁle announced in m if n > 3 (recall that |Θ|  3; on the other hand, if
n = 3, there is no need for this change so that φ  = φ), ni suitably chosen to win the modulo game and ai one of the best
possible outcomes for i under θ. This is possible under BRD, and now we are in Case A.
Step 2: No message proﬁle under rule (ii) is part of a recurrent class of BRD. We argue by contradiction. Recall that the
true preference proﬁle is θ, and let the message proﬁle under rule (ii) – (ii.a) or (ii.b) – in question be the following: allAuthor's personal copy
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agents j  = i announce mj = (φ,a,zj,nj), whereas agent i’s message is (φ ,a ,z ,ni). Then, the outcome is either z
a,φ
i under
rule (ii.a) or z  under rule (ii.b). But in either case, from here, each of the other agents j  = i can switch to (φ j,aj,aj,n 
j)  =
(φ,a,zj,nj),w i t hn 
j suitably chosen to win the modulo game and aj one of the best possible outcomes for j under θ.
Thus, we ﬁnd ourselves under rule (iii), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, from steps 1 and 2, all recurrent classes contain only proﬁles under rule (i). Moreover, each recurrent class
must yield a unique outcome, say a ∈ F(φ). To see this, notice that a class which includes strategy proﬁles with different
outcomes, must include proﬁles under rule (ii) or (iii), which cannot happen by steps 1 and 2.
In addition, each strategy proﬁle in a recurrent class must be a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism
when the true preferences are θ. A non-equilibrium proﬁle would produce with positive probability a deviation from rule (i),
so the recurrent class would include proﬁles under rules (ii) or (iii), which cannot happen by steps 1 and 2.
There is one family of recurrent classes of Nash equilibria that exists for all games induced by the mechanism. It is
composed of all the recurrent classes containing the truthful proﬁles (θ,a,zi,ni) for every a ∈ F(θ) reported by every agent
i ∈ N. A unilateral deviation from any such proﬁle to a proﬁle outside the recurrent class would produce a proﬁle either
under rule (ii.a) or under rule (ii.b). In either case, no such switch can happen under BRD (recall that F satisﬁes NWA).
But some games induced by the mechanism may have other (non-truthful) recurrent classes of Nash equilibria under
rule (i). Let us call one such class, the class (φ,a) and let (φ,a,zi,ni)i∈N, a ∈ F(φ), be one Nash equilibrium in class (φ,a).
Since this proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium, it must be true that for all i ∈ N, a  
φ
i z implies that a  θ
i z. If that were not the
case (i.e. if z  θ
i a), given that i can obtain z by deviating to rule (ii.b) because a  
φ
i z, he would choose to deviate and
(φ,a,zi,ni)i∈N would not be a Nash equilibrium.
But in fact, we know even more. Any z  = a that any agent i can obtain by changing his message would yield a message
proﬁle outside the class (φ,a). So if there is no deviation to such messages that yields z  = a in a BRD it must be because
a deviation would leave the deviant strictly worse off. That is, z cannot be indifferent to a for i under θ.H e n c e ,w em u s t
have that for all i ∈ N, a  
φ
i z implies that a  θ
i z.
But, because F is quasimonotonic, this implies that a ∈ F(θ) for any arbitrary proﬁle (φ,a,zi,ni)i∈N in any recurrent
class of the BRD. Therefore, F is implementable in recurrent strategies of BRD. 
Remark. The reader will have noticed the similarities between the mechanism used in this proof and the one in Maskin
(1999). There are some noticeable differences. Our rule (ii.a) is important because all better-responses (or best-responses)
could be used with positive probability by agents who get a revision opportunity. If an agent chooses to announce some
preference proﬁle/alternative different from the consensus and he is not punished, he will thus do so with positive prob-
ability. But, from there, it is a best-response for someone else to move to the modulo game, and the mechanism would
unravel. This justiﬁes the use of the punishments in rule (ii.a). In the parallel rule of Maskin’s (1999) mechanism, deviations
from rule (i) are allowed and are not a problem because they do not upset a Nash equilibrium. Our rule (ii.b), on the other
hand, has to be modiﬁed to complement the described change in rule (ii.a). Rule (iii) is a modulo game, instead of an
integer game. Finite games are usually viewed as more natural. Finally, our strategy set allows two reported alternatives, as
opposed to only one in Maskin (1999). This is done to prevent recurrent classes of the dynamics within rule (iii), creating a
path back to rule (i), as explained in step 1 of the proof.
Remark. Although we deﬁne the stochastic process to be BRD, the proof of Theorem 2 uses only best-responses. This im-
mediately shows that our results hold under best-reply dynamics (provided all best-responses are chosen with positive
probability). Given that players do not switch strategies with positive probability (and hence there can be periods of arbi-
trary ﬁnite length without any changes), they would also apply to dynamics that best reply to the empirical distribution of
play over some bounded sample of past history (a ﬁnite memory version of ﬁctitious play23).
3.3. Connections with other approaches
To the extent that one can model bounded rationality in many different ways, the reader may be wondering whether the
conditions identiﬁed for recurrent implementation of BRD processes might have some bearing with other such approaches.
This subsection answers this question in the aﬃrmative. In particular, a common thread found by several learning, evolution
and bounded rationality models in game theory is their support to certain classes of strict Nash equilibria as being “robust”
to many of these exercises. This rationale perhaps justiﬁes the question of the identiﬁcation of the conditions behind strict
Nash implementation, a question that the literature so far has overlooked. We turn to it next.
An SCC F is implementable in strict Nash equilibrium if there exists a mechanism G such that, for every θ ∈ Θ,t h es e to f
all strict Nash equilibrium outcomes of its induced game when the preference proﬁle is θ is F(θ).
A mechanism is non-imposing if for each agent i ∈ N,t h e r ee x i s tmi,m 
i ∈ Mi, such that for some m−i ∈ M−i g(mi,m−i)  =
g(m 
i,m−i). (In particular, non-imposing mechanisms allow all agents to meaningfully participate.)
23 Where we would again require all best-responses to be chosen with positive probability.Author's personal copy
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We ﬁrst state a result that identiﬁes necessary conditions for strict Nash implementability:
Theorem 3. If F is implementable in strict Nash equilibrium, F satisﬁes quasimonotonicity. Furthermore, if F is implementable in strict
Nash equilibrium by means of a non-imposing mechanism, F satisﬁes NWA.
Proof. The simple proof is left to the reader. 
We move right away to the suﬃciency result:
Theorem 4. Let n  3. If an SCC F satisﬁes quasimonotonicity and NWA, it is implementable in strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We sketch the proof by specifying a canonical mechanism that will serve to prove the statement. The mechanism
is a small variant of the canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, proposed by Repullo (1987) and used in Maskin
(1999).
Consider the mechanism G = ((Mi)i∈N, g), where agent i’s message set is Mi = Θ × Z × N.D e n o t ea g e n ti’s message
mi = (θi,zi,ni), and the agents’ message proﬁle by m. Let the outcome function g be deﬁned by the following rules:
(i) If for all i ∈ N, mi = (θ,a,1) with a ∈ F(θ), g(m) = a.
(ii) If for all j  = i, mj = (θ,a,1) with a ∈ F(θ), and mi = (φ,z,ni)  = (θ,a,1), one can have two cases:
(ii.a) If z  θ
i a, g(m) = z
a,θ
i – recall the deﬁnition of NWA.
(ii.b) If a  θ
i z, g(m) = z.
(iii) In all other cases, g(m) = zt, where t = (

i∈N ni)( mod n + 1).
Again, NWA implies that rule (ii.a) is well deﬁned. Then, one can ﬁrst establish that unanimous truthful announcements
under rule (i) are strict Nash equilibria that implement each of the desired outcomes. It is easy to see that one cannot
have strict equilibria either under rule (iii) or rule (ii). Thus, all strict Nash equilibria must happen under rule (i), and
quasimonotonicity of F and the construction of rule (ii) imply that any such strict equilibrium must yield an outcome
in F(θ).
Remark. Note how the solution concept employed – strict Nash equilibrium – allows one to dispense completely with the
no-veto condition, one of the suﬃcient conditions for Nash implementation outside of economic environments (see Maskin,
1999).24
Therefore, we have established that for any environment (economic or otherwise), quasimonotonicity and NWA provide
a complete characterization of strict Nash implementability if there are at least three agents. The comparison with the
conditions for recurrent implementability in BRD is apparent: only NWA ceases to be necessary then. Next, we investigate
how one can nail down the connection even further.
An SCC F is implementable in absorbing strategies (of BRD) if it is implementable in recurrent strategies and all recurrent
classes of the BRD process applied to its induced game are singletons.
Then, one can show the following connecting proposition. Its simple proof is also left to the reader:
Proposition 1. If an SCC F is implementable in absorbing strategies of BRD, F is implementable in strict Nash equilibrium. Conversely,
if an SCC F is implementable in strict Nash equilibrium and there exists an implementing mechanism whose recurrent classes of BRD
are all singletons, F is implementable in absorbing strategies of BRD.
Note how the second hypothesis of the converse clause in the proposition rules out non-singleton recurrent classes
of BRD, such as those involved in the modulo game of the mechanism we used to prove Theorem 4. Indeed, in some
environments, each agent’s best alternative may still be better than the outcomes of the SCC for all agents, and in this case,
we would have a recurrent class of BRD in which we cycle among each agent’s top-ranked outcomes.
Following a different approach to bounded rationality, Tumennasan (2008) considers implementation in limiting logit
quantal response equilibria (LLQRE), as deﬁned in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), where the limit is taken as noise in random
payoff maximization is removed, i.e., as behavior approaches full rationality. Noting some diﬃculties in characterizing the
structure of non-strict LLQRE, Tumennasan (2008) conﬁnes his attention to strict LLQRE and calls his implementability
notion restricted LLQRE implementation. Interestingly, he shows that both quasimonotonicity and a stronger version of NWA
are necessary for restricted LLQRE implementability, and in economic environments with at least three agents, he shows
that these two conditions, together with no-veto, are also suﬃcient. In other words, to the extent that strict Nash equilibria
24 See also Bochet (2007) and Benoit and Ok (2008), who escape no-veto within Nash implementation by using stochastic mechanisms.Author's personal copy
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are the common thread to these robustness results, the conditions identiﬁed in the current paper are also relevant for other
approaches to bounded rationality.
3.4. The examples revisited
To understand the differences between our approach and the one taken by the Nash implementation literature, it will be
instructive to revisit the two examples of Section 2.
Consider the strong Pareto correspondence FSP and the following two environments, somewhat enhanced with respect
to Example 1 by the introduction of a uniformly worst alternative w and a third agent. Let N ={ 1,2,3} and Z ={ z,z , w}.
Let state θ be such that z  θ
1 z   θ
1 w, z   θ
2 z  θ
2 w and z   θ
3 z  θ
3 w, so that FSP(θ) ={ z,z }.A n dl e tφ differ from θ only
in that z ∼
φ
1 z , implying that z / ∈ FSP(φ).
There is no mechanism to Nash-implement FSP if the domain includes these two environments. The reason is that, if
one could ﬁnd such a mechanism, it should support z by a Nash equilibrium when the state is θ. But those same messages
would still constitute a Nash equilibrium of the same mechanism when the state is φ, and thus, the mechanism would
always include an undesirable Nash equilibrium in state φ. On the other hand, FSP satisﬁes quasimonotonicity and NWA
over these two environments. This implies that one can apply to it the canonical mechanism of Theorem 4 to implement
FSP in strict Nash equilibria. Further, one can also apply to it the mechanism in the proof of Theorem 2, and make the
correspondence coincide with the recurrent classes of BRD processes. Note, however, how in both cases these mechanisms
fail to implement in Nash equilibrium. For example, in the mechanism of the proof of Theorem 4, the unanimous proﬁle
(θ,z,1) is a (non-strict) Nash equilibrium when the state is φ: the outcome is z, but agent 1 can induce z  through rule (ii.b).
Exactly the same happens in the mechanism of Theorem 2 with the unanimous proﬁle (θ,z,z,1) in state φ. In addition,
both mechanisms may generally have other non-strict Nash equilibria in rules (ii) or (iii) when the modulo game, without
the help of the non-veto condition, does not suﬃce to rule out undesired equilibria. We remark that all these additional
equilibria that prevent Nash implementation of FSP are non-strict, and therefore, non-robust to our dynamic approaches.
Consider now the weak Pareto correspondence FWP in a similarly enhanced version of Example 2. Let N ={ 1,2,3} and
Z ={ z,z }.L e tθ be such that z ∼θ
1 z , z   θ
2 z and z   θ
3 z, so that FWP(θ) ={ z,z }.A n dl e tφ differ from θ only in that
z   
φ
1 z, implying that z / ∈ FWP(φ).
Observe that FWP satisﬁes monotonicity and no-veto, and thus, by Maskin’s (1999) theorem, it is implementable in Nash
equilibrium. But note how, whatever the implementing mechanism is, the Nash equilibrium supporting z in state θ must be
non-strict. Since FWP violates quasimonotonicity in any domain that includes these two environments, it is not possible to
construct a mechanism with a dynamically robust convergence to z in state θ, which explains why the correspondence fails
to be implementable in recurrent strategies of BRD.
4. Non-quasimonotonic rules
Thus far we have seen that quasimonotonicity is the key condition that is necessary for (full) implementability in recur-
rent strategies. Moreover, with at least three agents, it is also suﬃcient if one imposes NWA. In this section, we explore the
possibilities of implementing non-quasimonotonic rules under more permissive implementability notions. We shall investi-
gate the conditions for partial implementability, as opposed to full.25
Suppose that the planner contents herself with society eventually reaching one of the socially desirable outcomes, but is
not concerned with constructing an institution that over time could get to all of them. That is, one can sometimes require
that the limiting play of BRD over time lead to outcomes in the SCC, without insisting that, for each of them, there be a
dynamic path that end up in it. This motivates the following notion of weak or partial implementability:
An SCC F is partially implementable in recurrent strategies (of BRD) if there exists a mechanism G such that, for every
θ ∈ Θ, all the outcomes of all recurrent classes of the BRD process applied to its induced game when the preference proﬁle
is θ lie in F(θ).
When one considers SCCs – as opposed to just SCFs, when both notions of partial and full implementability are the
same –, one would expect that the conditions that characterize partial implementability be substantially weaker than quasi-
monotonicity. And indeed, we next show that this is the case.
An SCC F is weakly quasimonotonic whenever for all θ,φ ∈ Θ, if it is true that for every a ∈ F(θ) and for every i ∈ N,
a  θ
i z implies that a  
φ
i z, we have that F(θ) ⊂ F(φ).
For SCCs, weak quasimonotonicity is weaker than quasimonotonicity, as it imposes a restriction on the SCC only when
the preferences in two environments are such that the strictly lower contour sets of each agent are nested at every out-
come of the SCC. If the range of the SCC is rich, this will often be a requirement that is hard to meet, and therefore, in
these cases, weak quasimonotonicity will be vacuously satisﬁed. Of course, for SCFs, weak quasimonotonicity reduces to
quasimonotonicity.
25 A second approach is pursued in Cabrales and Serrano (2010). While insisting on full implementation, in that paper we drop the requirement of
converging using BRD no matter what mutation process one might use. One thus gets to implement a larger class of SCFs, but to do so, we make extra
speciﬁc assumptions on environments, preferences and mutations.Author's personal copy
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We ﬁrst state the necessity result:
Theorem 5. If F is partially implementable in recurrent strategies of a BRD process, F is weakly quasimonotonic.
Proof. Let the true preference proﬁle be θ.B e c a u s eF is partially implementable in recurrent strategies of BRD, the only
outcomes that correspond to strategy proﬁles in recurrent classes of the dynamics is some a ∈ F(θ).
Let any a ∈ F(θ) be an outcome of a recurrent class of a BRD process. Let a preference proﬁle φ be such that for all
b ∈ F(θ), and for all i, b  θ
i z implies that b  
φ
i z.S i n c ea is an outcome compatible with a recurrent class of the dynamics
when preferences are θ, this means that agent i’s unilateral deviations from recurrent strategy proﬁles in that class must
yield either a again, or outcomes z such that a  θ
i z. But this implies that a is also supported by recurrent proﬁles of BRD
when preferences are φ.S i n c eF is partially implementable in recurrent strategies of BRD, this implies that a ∈ F(φ). That
is, F must be weakly quasimonotonic. 
To obtain the suﬃciency result, we need to strengthen the NWA condition. The strong NWA condition is still compatible
with many SCCs of interest, for example in standard exchange economic environments in which one can deﬁne a worst
outcome – the zero bundle – for all agents:
An SCC F satisﬁes strong-no-worst-alternative (SNWA) whenever for every agent i, every preference proﬁle θ there exists
an outcome zθ
i such that for every a ∈ F(θ), a  θ
i z
,θ
i .
The suﬃciency result for partial implementation in recurrent classes of BRD follows:
Theorem 6. Let n  3. If an SCC F satisﬁes weak quasimonotonicity and SNWA, it is partially implementable in recurrent strategies
of BRD.
Proof. We sketch the proof as follows. For the canonical mechanism we construct, we shall need the following deﬁnition:
Let  F(θ) ={ a ∈ F(θ) |∃ φ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N, b ∈ Z such that a  θ
i b and b  
φ
i a}. Note that  F(θ) = ∅ implies that F(θ) ⊂ F(φ)
for all φ ∈ Θ if F is weakly quasimonotonic.
Consider the mechanism G = ((Mi)i∈N, g), where agent i’s message set is Mi = Θ × Z × Z × N.D e n o t ea g e n ti’s message
mi = (θi,ai,zi,ni), and the agents’ message proﬁle by m. Let the outcome function g be deﬁned by the following rules:
(i) If for all i ∈ N, mi = (θ,ai,zi,ni):
(i.a) If  F(θ)  = ∅ and ai ∈ F(θ) for all i, then g(m) = at, where t = (

i∈N ni)( mod n + 1).
(i.b) If  F(θ) = ∅ and ai ∈ F(θ) for all i, then g(m) = at, where t = (

i∈N ni)( mod n + 1).
(ii) If for all j  = i, mj = (θ,aj,zj,nj) with aj as in rule (i), and mi = (φ,ai,zi,ni) with either φ  = θ,o rai / ∈ F(θ)  = ∅ or
ai / ∈ F(θ),  F(θ) = ∅, then one can have two cases:
(ii.a) If zi  θ
i aj for some j ∈ N, g(m) = zθ
i – recall the deﬁnition of the SNWA property.
(ii.b) If aj  θ
i zi for all j ∈ N, g(m) = zi.
(iii) In all other cases, g(m) = zt, where t = (

i∈N ni)( mod n + 1).
Note how the mechanism makes use of two distinct modulo games, one under rule (i) and a second one under rule (iii).
The former is the real novelty of this mechanism, as the recurrent classes of BRD will all make use of it. Indeed, the steps
to show that no recurrent classes are compatible with either rule (ii) or rule (iii) follow similar arguments to those in the
proof of Theorem 2 and we omit them.
Let θ be the true preference proﬁle. We can have two types of recurrent classes under rule (i). One family of recurrent
classes that always exists is the class that contains the truthful proﬁles (θ,ai,zi,ni). This can happen both when all ai ∈ F(θ)
and  F(θ)  = ∅, or when ai ∈ F(θ) and  F(θ) = ∅. In either case, no individual wants to move out of the class, because exiting
the class involves going through rules (ii.a) or (ii.b), which strictly decrease his payoff.
But one may have other (non-truthful) recurrent classes under rule (i). Let (φ,ai,zi,ni)i∈N, be such an arbitrary class.
This can happen both when all ai ∈  F(φ) and  F(φ)  = ∅, or when ai ∈ F(φ) and  F(φ) = ∅. If  F(φ) = ∅ recall that this
implies that F(φ) ⊂ F(φ ) for all φ  ∈ Θ, if F is weakly quasimonotonic. In particular it is true that F(φ) ⊂ F(θ), and then
this agrees with our concept of implementability.
On the other hand, if  F(φ)  = ∅, we have two possible cases. One if the hypothesis of weak quasimonotonicity is met
(i.e. for every a ∈ F(φ) and for every i ∈ N, a  
φ
i z implies that a  θ
i z). In this case we have that F(φ) ⊂ F(θ), and hence
every ai ∈ F(θ). In the second case the hypothesis of weak quasimonotonicity does not hold. In that case, there exists an
individual i, alternatives a ∈ F(φ) and b such that a  
φ
i b and b  θ
i a. Note that, if the considered proﬁle is part of a recurrent
class, the same class contains a proﬁle where all agents announce the same a (this is so because an agent can always choose
an integer not to win the modulo game so as not to change the existing outcome, a weak better reply). Hence, he can
weakly improve his payoff by inducing rule (ii.b) choosing (θ,a,b,ni). This would contradict that this outcome belongs to a
recurrent class. Author's personal copy
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Remark. This proof shows that one can converge to a set of outcomes, where the convergence can be to more than one
outcome literally: the typical recurrent class makes use of the modulo game within rule (i). This is the weak convergence
notion used in Hart and Mas-Colell (2000), where regret matching dynamics is proposed as a way to converge to the set of
correlated equilibrium distributions. It is interesting to note that, while the entire correspondence of correlated equilibrium
distributions will satisfy the weak quasimonotonicity condition over large classes of normal form games – viewed as our
environments –, certain speciﬁc correlated equilibrium distributions – viewed as SCFs – violate quasimonotonicity (see
Kar et al., 2010). Taken together, these results show the diﬃculties of BRD converging to speciﬁc correlated equilibrium
distributions, whereas convergence to the entire set is possible.
5. Incomplete information
This section tackles the extension of our results to incomplete information environments. For ease of exposition, we
shall present our results for SCFs. We shall begin with the (almost) characterization of SCFs that are implementable in
recurrent strategies of interim BRD. We consider economic environments for our results in interim BRD, although our last
subsection, aiming to connect with other approaches through implementation in strict Bayesian equilibria, dispenses with
this assumption.
5.1. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions
We now describe an incomplete information environment.
Consider for simplicity economic environments. More precisely, let agent i’s consumption set be a ﬁnite set, Xi ⊂ Rl
+,
where 0 ∈ Xi. One can specify that each agent holds initially the bundle ωi ∈ Xi with

i∈N ωi = ω (private ownership
economies), or simply that there is an aggregate endowment of goods ω (distribution economies). The set of alternatives is
the set of allocations:
Z =

(xi)i∈N ∈

Xi:
	
i∈N
xi ω


.
Each agent knows his type θi ∈ Θi, a ﬁnite set of possible types. Let Θ =

i∈N Θi be the set of possible states of the
world, let Θ−i =

j =i Θj of type proﬁles θ−i of agents other than i. We shall sometimes write a state θ = (θi,θ−i).W e
assume that all states in Θ have positive ex-ante probability.26
Let qi(θ−i|θi) be type θi’s interim probability distribution over the type proﬁles θ−i of the other agents. An SCF (or
state-contingent allocation) is a mapping f : Θ  → Z that assigns to each state of the world a feasible allocation.
Let A denote the set of SCFs. We shall assume that uncertainty concerning the states of the world does not affect the
economy’s endowments, but only preferences and beliefs.
We shall write type θi’s interim expected utility over an SCF f as follows:
Ui( f |θi) ≡
	
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)ui

f (θi,θ−i),(θi,θ−i)

.
Note how the Bernoulli (ex-post) utility function ui may change with the state.
We also make the following assumptions on preferences:
(1) No consumption externalities: for each state θ, ui : Xi  → R. That is, an agent’s ex-post utility function in each state
depends on the bundle of goods that he consumes, and not on other agents’ bundles.
(2) Strictly increasing ex-post utility functions: For all i,f o ra l lθ and for all xi ∈ Xi,i fyi  xi, ui(yi,θ)>ui(xi,θ).27 Note
how this implies that 0 is the worst bundle for every agent.
A mechanism G = ((Mi)i∈N, g), played simultaneously by myopic agents, consists of agent i’s set Mi of messages (for
each i ∈ N,a g e n ti’s message is a mapping from Θi to Mi), and the outcome function g : M  → Z. A Bayesian equilibrium is
a message proﬁle in which each type chooses an interim best-response to the other agents’ messages, and a strict Bayesian
equilibrium is a Bayesian equilibrium in which every type’s interim best-response is a strict best-response. To prevent
any kind of learning about the state, we shall assume that, after an outcome is observed, agents forget it (or, closer to
the evolutionary tradition, agents are replaced by other agents who share the same preferences and prior beliefs as their
predecessors, but are not aware of their experience).28
26 We make this assumption for simplicity in the presentation. With some minor modiﬁcations in the arguments, one can prove similar results if Θ∗  = Θ
is the set of states with positive probability, according to every agent’s prior belief.
27 For vectors xi, yi ∈ Xi, we use the standard conventions: xi  yi whenever xil  yil with at least one strict inequality; and xi   yi whenever xil > yil
for every commodity l.
28 There are a host of alternative assumptions one could make, for example, that each agent receives his type in each period as a draw from the i.i.d.
underlying distribution; see Dekel et al. (2004) for an appraisal of such different modeling choices.Author's personal copy
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Let agent i of type θi be allowed to revise his message in period t. He does so using the interim better-response logic, i.e.,
he switches with positive probability to any message that improves (weakly) his interim expected utility, given his interim
beliefs qi(θ−i|θi). That is, letting mt be the message proﬁle at the beginning of period t,t y p eθi switches from mt
i(θi) to any
m 
i such that:
	
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)ui

g

m 
i,m
t
−i(θ−i)

,(θi,θ−i)


	
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)ui

m
t(θ),(θi,θ−i)

.
We adapt now the deﬁnition of implementability to environments with incomplete information:
An SCF f is implementable in recurrent strategies (of interim BRD) if there exists a mechanism G such that the interim
BRD process applied to its induced game has f as its unique outcome of the recurrent classes of the process.
5.1.1. Necessity
As for the assumptions on SCFs, we still assume that it is ε-secure in each state, although this will not be a necessary
condition. In contrast, we shall introduce two more properties, which will be necessary for implementability in recurrent
strategies. The next one is the strict version of incentive compatibility.
An SCF f is strictly incentive compatible if truth-telling is a strict Bayesian equilibrium of its direct mechanism, i.e., if for
all i and for all θi,
	
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)ui

f (θ),(θi,θ−i)

>
	
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)ui

f

θ 
i,θ−i

,(θi,θ−i)

for every θ 
i  = θi.
An SCF f is incentive compatible if the inequalities in the preceding deﬁnition are allowed to be weak.
Theorem 7. If f is implementable in recurrent strategies of an interim BRD process, f is incentive compatible. Furthermore, if at least
one of the recurrent classes is a singleton, f is strictly incentive compatible.
Proof. Suppose that f is implementable in recurrent strategies of interim BRD. This means that, for this Markov process,
there is a unique outcome supported by the recurrent classes of the process, and this outcome is f .S i n c e f is the outcome
of any such recurrent set of BRD, it must be incentive compatible.
Furthermore, if one of the recurrent classes is a singleton, any deviation from the message proﬁle that is an absorbing
state of the dynamics must worsen each type’s interim expected utility, and thus, f must be strictly incentive compati-
ble. 
The next deﬁnitions prepare the way for the other condition that we shall present in this subsection.
Consider a strategy in a direct mechanism for agent i, i.e., a mapping αi = (αi(θi))θi∈Θi : Θi  → Θi.Adeception α = (αi)i∈N
is a collection of such mappings where at least one differs from the identity mapping.
G i v e na nS C F f and a deception α,l e t[ f ◦α] denote the following SCF: [ f ◦α](θ) = f(α(θ)) for every θ ∈ Θ.
Finally, for a type θ 
i ∈ Θi, and an arbitrary SCF y,l e tyθ 
i(θ) = y(θ 
i,θ−i) for all θ ∈ Θ.
An SCF f is Bayesian quasimonotonic if for all deceptions α,f o ra l li ∈ N, and for all θi ∈ Θi, whenever
Ui( f |θi)>Ui(yθ 
i|θi) ∀θ 
i ∈ Θi implies Ui( f ◦α|θi)>Ui(y ◦α|θi) (1)
o n em u s th a v et h a t f ◦α = f .
Note how Bayesian quasimonotonicity is to Bayesian monotonicity (e.g., Jackson, 1991) as quasimonotonicity was to
Maskin monotonicity.
We move on now to our next necessity result. In it, Bayesian quasimonotonicity shows up as a necessary condition when
implementability is sought in recurrent strategies.
Theorem 8. If f is implementable in recurrent strategies of an interim BRD process, f is Bayesian quasimonotonic.
Proof. Suppose that f is implementable in recurrent strategies of interim BRD. This means that f is the only outcome of
the recurrent classes of the dynamics. In particular, this implies that there exists a message proﬁle m such that g(m) = f ,
in one of such recurrent classes.
Any unilateral deviation from m made by type θi either results also in f, or it changes the outcome. In the latter case,
call such an outcome y. If the deviation also involves pretending to be type θ 
i, the corresponding outcome imposed can be
written as yθ 
i . But, since we are starting from a recurrent class of BRD, any such deviations that change the outcome fall in
the strictly lower contour set of the interim preferences for type θi at f . That is, Ui( f|θi)>Ui(yθ 
i|θi). This statement holds
for every θi and for every i.
Consider now an arbitrary deception α and suppose, following the hypothesis of Bayesian quasimonotonicity – Eq. (1) –,
that any such yθ 
i , when the deception α is used, is such that Ui( f ◦ α|θi)>Ui(y ◦ α|θi) for every i and θi. Consider theAuthor's personal copy
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strategy proﬁle m ◦ α. Its outcome is f ◦ α. Then, any unilateral deviation from it on the part of type θi either does not
change the outcome or yields an outcome y ◦ α such that Ui( f ◦ α|θi)>Ui(y ◦ α|θi). To see this, note that if type αi(θi)
found a weakly proﬁtable deviation from m◦α, he would be implementing an outcome y ◦α that he likes at least as much
as f ◦ α. But then, the same deviation made by type θi from m w o u l dl e a dt oa no u t c o m eyθ 
i  = f that he would like as
much as f , contradicting that m was part of a recurrent class of the interim BRD process.
This implies that m ◦ α is also an element of a recurrent class of the BRD process. Thus, for f to be implementable
in recurrent strategies, it is required that the outcome of m ◦ α, i.e., f ◦ α,b e f . This means that f must be Bayesian
quasimonotonic. 
5.1.2. Suﬃciency
Our next suﬃciency result follows:
Theorem 9. Suppose the environments satisfy Assumptions (1) and (2) in each state. Let n  3.I fa nS C F f i sε-secure in each state,
strictly incentive compatible and Bayesian quasimonotonic, f is implementable in recurrent strategies of interim BRD.
Proof. We construct the following canonical mechanism G = ((Mi)i∈N, g), where agent i’s message set Mi = Θi × A.D e n o t e
mi = (m1
i ,m2
i ). The outcome function g is deﬁned in the following rules:
(i) If for every agent i ∈ N, m2
i = f , g(m) = f(m1).
(ii) If for all j  = im 2
j = f and m2
i = y  = f , one can have two cases:
(ii.a) If there exist types θi,θ 
i ∈ Θi such that Ui(yθ 
i|θi)  Ui( f|θi), g(m) = ( fi(m1) − β, f−i(m1)), where fi(m1) 
fi(m1)−β ∈ Xi.
(ii.b) If for all θi,θ 
i ∈ Θi, Ui(yθ 
i|θi)<Ui( f|θi), g(m) = y(m1).
(iii) In all other cases, g(m) = 0.
Following similar steps as in the proof of Theorem 2, properly adapted to economic environments and using the zero
outcome instead of the modulo game, one can show that all recurrent classes of the dynamics happen under rule (i).
Moreover, their outcomes are either f or f ◦ α. But in the latter case, since f is Bayesian quasimonotonic, one can show
that f ◦α = f . 
Remark. Theorems 7, 8 and 9 provide almost a characterization of the rules that are implementable in recurrent strategies
of BRD in economic environments with at least three agents. We shall consider non-economic environments and the more
general implications of these results in the last subsection of the current section, through the notion of implementability in
strict Bayesian equilibria.
5.2. Towards a more general theory: strict Bayesian implementation
We close the paper by returning to environments in which the economic assumption is not made. Paraphrasing the
argument in Section 3.3, the reader may wonder how relevant the results obtained in the current incomplete information
section for adaptive interim better-replies would be to alternative ways to model bounded rationality in implementation
settings under incomplete information. Perhaps a common thread could be found through the use of strict Bayesian equilib-
rium as a solution concept – it is plausible to think that these equilibria, based on strict inequalities, will have more robust
properties.29
The results on strict Bayesian implementation offered below may serve this role of connection with the previous results
in the current section. Further, they have interest in their own right. Jackson (1991) offered only a suﬃciency result for
Bayesian implementation in general environments, and no characterization is available to date, to the best of our knowledge.
We shall provide such a characterization for strict Bayesian implementation.
An SCF f is implementable in strict Bayesian equilibrium if there exists a mechanism G s u c ht h a tt h eu n i q u eo u t c o m eo f
all strict Bayesian equilibria of its induced game is f .
We adapt the deﬁnition of the NWA property to general environments with incomplete information as follows:
An SCF f satisﬁes the Bayesian no-worst-alternative (BNWA)p r o p e r t yi ff o re a c hi ∈ N there exists an SCF y satisfying:
1. Ui(y|θi)  Ui(yθ 
i|θi)−ε for all θi,θ 
i, and
2. if f ◦α  = f , Ui( f ◦α|θi)  Ui(y ◦α|θi) for some θi ∈ Θi,
such that for all θi ∈ Θi, Ui( f|θi)>Ui(y|θi).30
29 Although more work is needed in the general area of learning under incomplete information, see, e.g., Jensen et al. (2005) for a result on stochastic
stability that selects among strict Bayesian equilibria.
30 For the results below, the maximum value of ε allowed in the ﬁrst requirement for y corresponds to the maximum amount of misrepresentation within
the direct mechanism for y that compensates for the gap created by the strict inequality between the interim utilities of f and of y.Author's personal copy
A. Cabrales, R. Serrano / Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 360–374 373
First, we state the following necessity result:
Theorem 10. If an SCF f is implementable in strict Bayesian equilibrium, it is strictly incentive compatible and Bayesian quasimono-
tonic. Furthermore, if the implementation is achieved via a non-imposing mechanism, f must also satisfy BNWA.
Proof. The proof of the ﬁrst part is similar to the proofs of Theorems 7 and 8. The proof of the second part is left to the
reader. 
Next, we provide a suﬃciency result for environments with at least three agents. The two results together essentially
provide a characterization of strict Bayesian implementation for this case:
Theorem 11. Let n  3. If an SCF f is strictly incentive compatible and Bayesian quasimonotonic, and satisﬁes BNWA, it is imple-
mentable in strict Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. We construct the following canonical mechanism G = ((Mi)i∈N, g), where agent i’s message set Mi = Θi × A × N.
Denote mi = (m1
i ,m2
i ,m3
i ). The outcome function g is deﬁned in the following rules:
(i) If for every agent i ∈ N, m2
i = f and m3
i = 1, g(m) = f(m1).
(ii) If for all j  = im 2
j = f , m3
j = 1, and (m2
i ,m3
i ) = (z,ni)  = ( f,1), one can have two cases:
(ii.a) If there exist types θi,θ 
i ∈ Θi such that Ui(zθ 
i|θi)  Ui( f|θi), g(m) = y(m1), where y is taken from the deﬁnition
of the BNWA property.
(ii.b) If for all θi,θ 
i ∈ Θi, Ui(zθ 
i|θi)<Ui( f|θi), g(m) = z(m1).
(iii) In all other cases, g(m) = zt(m1), where mt
2 = zt, t = (

i∈N m3
i )( mod n + 1).
Since each agent can induce one of his top-ranked SCFs with the modulo game, there cannot be strict Bayesian equilibria
under either rule (ii) or (iii). Clearly, the truthful proﬁle under rule (i) is a strict Bayesian equilibrium, by strict incentive
compatibility and by the ﬁrst requirement for y in the BNWA property, after unilateral deviations would induce the two
versions of rule (ii). Finally, Bayesian quasimonotonicity and the second statement in the requirements for y in the BNWA
property prevent the existence of a strict Bayesian equilibrium under rule (i) in which a deception α is being used and
f ◦α  = f . 
6. Conclusion
This paper has studied the classic implementation problem in evolutionary settings. In particular, necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for implementability in recurrent strategies of BRD processes have been identiﬁed. In this exercise, variants of
the well-known monotonicity conditions in implementation theory seem to be the key to capture good dynamic properties
of implementation. In the case of incomplete information, incentive compatibility and a variant of Bayesian monotonicity
show up as necessary conditions for evolutionary implementation in our sense. The analysis of the implementation problem
under alternative forms of bounded rationality should be the subject of further research, and to this end, we have also
derived characterizations for implementability in strict equilibria, both under complete and incomplete information, which
are closely related to the recurrent implementation results of the paper.
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